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EXCLUSION OF FAMILIES WITH
CHILDREN FROM HOUSING

For most of this century the middle-class American dream has
centered on the family and the home. Traditionally, couples
married young and intended to have children; they began their
married lives in apartments or in modest single-family homes.
Familial prosperity was expected to keep pace with pregnancies
as the families moved into ever larger homes in ever more affluent areas.
However much that image may once have reflected the common middle-class American experience, today it represents only
one of several family and housing patterns. 1 A variety of social
and economic phenomena, including changes in the role of
women, a rising divorce rate, greater mobility, and higher interest rates for mortgages, has contributed to this change. 2 At the
same time, another phenomenon has become more prevalent:
the exclusion of families with children from housing. 3
Although the gravity of the exclusionary practice varies with
the availability of housing in any given geographical area, statis1. See A. DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980's 3 (1983) (projecting the market for
rental housing during the rest of the decade); R. GOETZE, RESCUING THE AMERICAN DREAM
4 (1983) (discussing housing in general).
2. See R. GOETZE, supra note 1, at 4-7 (discussing changes in demographics of home
ownership).
3. Many commentators have addressed this topic. Recent discussion has centered on
an interesting group of California cases. See infra text accompanying notes 132-40. See,
e.g., Dunaway & Blied, Discrimination Against Children in Rental Housing: A California Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21 (1979) (discussing applicability of California
Civil Rights Act to rental housing); O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment for

Rent-Children Not Allowed: The Illinois Children in Housing Statute-Its Viability
and a Proposal for its Comprehensive Amendment, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 64 (1975) (analyzing current Illinois law and proposing an amendment); Travalio, Suffer the Little
Children-But Not in My Neighborhood: A Constitutional View of Age-Restrictive
Housing, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 295 (1979) (applying federal constitutional law to questions of
age-exclusive housing); Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent: An Examination of Laws
Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1829
(1981) (seminal Note discussing child discrimination as one facet of a general housing
shortage) [hereinafter cited as Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent]; Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children: The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L.
559 (1977) (discussing history of topic) [hereinafter cited as Note, Housing

Discrimination].
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tics show that exclusionary policies potentially affect millions of
people. Until recently, only a few states had established any policy on this type of exclusion. 4 Because market forces controlled
the situation, landlords asserted without any supporting evidence the need to exclude children from their housing units. 11
Meanwhile, families in some areas waited for months before
finding any affordable housing. 6
The dilemma suggests no easy answer. One cannot dismiss out
of hand the economic interests of landlords or the privacy interests of families. Moreover, landlords do not stand alone in their
opposition to the presence of children; indeed, many potential
neighbors of currently excluded families demand the right . to
continue living in adults-only neighborhoods. Among those objecting to the presence of children, the elderly as a class most
strongly assert a need to live in a neighborhood without children. 7 Any solution must respect all these interests.
Historically, child-exclusion policies have most frequently affected apartment dwellers. Nevertheless, recent changes in housing trends have drawn other types of housing into the controversy. 8 Because they are often structurally similar to
apartments, condominiums have received a large amount of legal
attention. 9 Furthermore, the presence of large numbers of elderly people has contributed to efforts to exclude children from
mobile home parks. 10 'Finally, although private homes have re4. See infra text accompanying notes 111-30.
5. See, e.g., CBS News, Adults Only, 60 MINUTES (June 17, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as CBS News, Adults Only]; CBS News, No Kids Allowed, 60 MINUTES (July 30, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as CBS News, No Kids Allowed].
6. See CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 5; CBS News, No Kids Allowed, supra
note 5; R. GOETZE, supra note 1, at 45. The rental market in California is so tight that
some families seek shelter in residential hotels and motels. Predictably, they are experiencing exclusion in that sector and are pursuing legal remedies. See CAL. DEP'T OF FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, ADDENDUM TO DIRECTIVE 22, Feb. 1, 1985.
7. See, e.g., Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and Enforceability of Residential Segregation by Age, 76 M1cu. L. REV. 64 (1977) (discussing the constitutionality
of retirement communities reserved exclusively for the elderly); Travalio, supra note 3.
8. See R. GOETZE, supra note 1; see infra text accompanying notes 23-35.
9. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427,
191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983) (holding that condominium associations could not exclude parents with children from their condominiums), rev'g 132 Cal. App. 3d 178, 183 Cal. Rptr.
111 (1982); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that condominium 'associations could not exclude families with children), aff'd on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979) (holding that condominium
associations may exclude families with children, as long as they treat all tenants fairly).
10. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (holding that
residents could enforce a covenant forbidding minor children in a mobile home park);
Adamson Cos. v. Zipp, 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984) (holding that
adults-only provision of mobile home lease violated California civil rights act).
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mained comparatively free of such regulation, some private
housing developments have recently begun to enforce child-exclusion policies. 11
Excluded families seeking federal protection have met with
little success. 12 States, however, have taken a variety of positions
on this issue. Nine states have enacted statutory measures explicitly prohibiting the exclusion of children from housing. 13 Although none of the remaining jurisdictions have enacted statutes
specifically addressing this matter, courts in two of these states
have applied provisions in state civil or human rights statutes to
the question. One of these states, California, 14 forbade the practice of child exclusion, while the other, Michigan,1 6 permitted it.
Nevertheless, the majority of the states have yet to address the
problem. 16
This Note attempts to resolve the most significant problems
raised by discrimination against children in housing. Part I
briefly analyzes the prevalence of child exclusion in different
types of housing. It also provides a statistical analysis of the
rental housing market to enable the reader to gauge the extent
of the problem in one type of housing. Part II discusses policy
arguments supporting both those who seek to exclude children
11. See Frank, Must Baby Go?, 70 A.BA J., July 1984, at 30; Frank, Move, Family
Told, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 33 [hereinafter cited as Frank, Move].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 86-110.
13. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-303, -1317 (Supp. 1984-1985); CAL. Civ. CODE § 51.2
(West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-64a (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§ 6503 (Supp. 1984); Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-104 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 1518, § 4(11) (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1982);
MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-.03 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp. 1984-1985);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
14. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496
(interpreting state civil rights act to forbid discrimination against children), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 858 (1982). The California Legislature amended the Unruh Civil Rights Act
with a new section effective January 1, 1985. (CAL. Civ. ConE § 51.2 (West Supp. 1985)).
The new section reads:
(a) Section 51 shall be construed to prohibit a business establishment from discriminating in the sale or rental of housing based upon age. Where accommodations are designed to meet the physical and social needs of senior citizens, a
business establishment may establish and preserve such housing for senior citi. zens . . . .
(b) This section is intended to clarify the holdings in Marina Point, Ltd. v.
Wolfson ... and O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association . . . .
15. Michigan Dep't Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82
(1984) (interpreting state civil rights act to allow landlord to refuse to make certain
apartments available to families with children).
16. One state, Ohio, has adopted a policy allowing landlords to discriminate against
children. In Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946), the Ohio
Supreme Court held that landlords may confine occupancy of apartments in apartment
buildings to adults and evict a tenant who brings a child to live in the apartment.
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and those who advocate government policies forbidding exclusion. Part III then examines the various approaches that states
have adopted in this area, as well as federal implications of the
issue. Finally, the Note presents a model statute designed to
achieve a just accommodation of the interests of all the parties
involved in this controversy.
I. BACKGROUND

The exclusion of families with children from housing primarily
burdens families who rent apartments. Recent litigation suggests, however, that exclusionary practices occur in all types of
housing. No statistics exist to indicate the extent to which exclusion affects families. Nevertheless, estimates tend to show that
millions of families must contend with exclusionary policies.
A.

Scope of the Problem

Although child exclusion is not a new problem,1 7 the attention
the issue has received and the litigation it has spawned have increased dramatically in recent years. 1 s A shortage of affordable
housing, which has become acute in some regions,1 9 has forced
excluded families to seek judicial assistance in overcoming discriminatory barriers. To aid them in their court fights, many of
these families have turned to advocates of children's and tenants' rights. 20 Over time these groups have developed expertise
in the field and have striven to persuade lawmakers to establish
a coherent policy preventing child exclusion. 21 These two factors,
a shortage of housing and increasing numbers of well-represented plaintiffs, have caused the controversy of child exclusion
to spill over from rental housing into all types of housing.
Because the exclusion of children from apartments 22 best ex17. New Jersey passed the first state statute prohibiting housing discrimination
against children in 1898. L.1898, c. 235, p. 794.
18. See supra notes 1, 3, 5, and 7.
19. See, e.g., R. GOETZE, supra note 1, at 11-16; Lowry, Rental Housing in the 1970s:
Searching for the Crisis, in RENTAL Hous1NG: Is THERE A Ca1s1s? 23 (J. Weicher, K.
Villani, E. Roistacher, eds. 1981).
20. These groups include the Fair Housing Project, Santa Monica, Cal.; the National
Center for Youth Law, San Francisco, Cal.; and the Fair Housing Center, Detroit, Mich.
21. See, e.g., YOUTH LAW NEWS, published by the National Center for Youth Law.
22. Throughout"this Note "apartment" refers to a single unit, "apartment building"
refers to a building containing several apartments, and "apartment complex" refers to a
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emplifies the general problem, this Note discusses exclusion
from rental housing. Nevertheless, to formulate a coherent, consistent policy regulating child exclusion, one must examine the
broad scope of the problem. The following cases demonstrate
the patchwork approach courts have taken in addressing childexclusion issues and thus emphasize the need for uniform legislation covering all types of housing.
Two state courts have considered the subject of exclusion of
families from condominiums. The California Supreme Court relied on an earlier decision 23 to hold that a condominium owners'
association may not prohibit a family with children from living
in a condominium. 24 The Supreme Court of Florida reached the
same conclusion when it affirmed a lower court's refusal to allow
a condominium owner to exclude a family with children from its
condominium. 2111rhe Florida court, however, issued a much more
limited ruling than its California counterpart. It based its holding on the landlord's unequal application of its policy26 and
stated that it would not hesitate to uphold an exclusionary policy that was applied fairly to all residents. 27
As in the case of condominiums, two state courts have spoken
on the subject of exclusion from mobile homes. Although an Arizona statute forbids discrimination against children in rental
housing, 28 an appellate court in that state refused to apply the
statute in a non-rental case and enforced a restrictive covenant
against parents who lived in a mobile home development with
their minor children. 29 In Adamson Cos. v. Zipp, 30 a California
group of apartment buildings under single ownership or management.
23. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
24. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796-97, 663 P.2d 427,
431, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1982).
For the purpose of the decision, the court ruled that the association was the alter ego
of the condominium developer, and thus fell within the category of business establishments proscribed by the state statute from discriminating in real estate transactions.
25. White Egret Condominiums, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), aff'g on
other grounds, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
26. Id. at 352.
27. Id. at 351. The Florida appeals court had relied on federal constitutional decisions-Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing the right to marry); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing the right to marital privacy); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussing the right to procreate)-to establish that exclusion affected areas of privacy that the fourteenth amendment protects. Franklin v.
White Egret Condominiums, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). In a.ffinning the lower court ruling, the state
supreme court clearly disapproved that court's dicta concerning exclusionary policies.
379 So. 2d at 351.
28. AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-303, -1317 (Supp. 1983-1984).
29. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974). The court explicitly re-
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appellate court recently extended its line of cases prohibiting
child exclusion 31 in order to protect families living in mobile
home developments. In an earlier case, 32 the California Supreme
Court had excepted mobile home parks designed specifically for
older people from the prohibition against child exclusion. The
Zipp court did not find the park under consideration to be a
specialized facility and held that the park could not exclude the
plaintiff and his family. 33
Although federal and some state statutes prevent discrimination in the sale of private homes, no parents had challenged
their exclusion from housing they had owned previously until a
family living in an adults-only community in Florida challenged
the use of a restrictive covenant to evict them from their home
after the birth of a child. A lower state court ruled that "age
restrictions are not odious if they are reasonable and are not
used to prevent people from finding housing." 34 It is not surprising that little exclusion of children has occurred in private
homes. The notion of age-homogeneous neighborhoods is relatively new, 311 and so owners and developers have only recently
considered excluding families. Moreover, parents did not consider litigating until challenges to exclusionary policies in other
types of housing became more frequent and more successful.
fused to address the question that would arise if the owner of property encumbered by a
restrictive covenant against children attempted to rent his or her property to a family
with children. 22 Ariz. App. at 227, 526 P.2d at 751. In response, the legislature amended
the relevant statutes to make it a petty offense to rent to children in violation of a restrictive covenant or to rent property to a family with children within an "exclusive
adult subdivision." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-303(B) (Supp. 1983-1984). At the same
time, the legislature reduced the penalty for refusing to rent to families with children
from its earlier punishment of a "first offense by a fine of not less than one hundred nor
more than five hundred dollars, and for a subsequent conviction by a fine of five hundred
dollars, by imprisonment for three months in the county jail, or both." ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-303 (1974). The current statute treats all violations as petty offenses, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-303 (Supp. 1984), punishable by fines of not more than three hundred dollars. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-802(0) (1978).
30.

163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984).

31. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 132-37. See also
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790,662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1983); supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
32. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
33.

163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984).

34.

Frank, Move, supra note 11.

35.

See Travalio, supra note 3; Doyle, supra note 7.
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Statistical Background

No definitive figures exist on the number of families excluded
from housing because of their children. Because few people as
yet perceive a problem in non-rental housing, 36 no one has undertaken a statistical study of the exclusion of children from
such housing. Despite its methodological limitations, a study
sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and performed by the Institute for Social Research
at the University of Michigan (ISR) addresses the more common
phenomenon of discrimination in rental housing. 37 Relying on a
random sampling of renters and apartment managers, the report
considers only instances of outright discrimination and ignores
subtle cases in which landlords or managers choose to rent to
single persons or couples in preference to families with children. 38 Although it may underestimate the problem, the ISR
study, along with census figures, suggests the extent of exclusion
in rental housing.
The 1980 census found approximately 59 million families in
the United States, over half of which (30.5 million) include children under eighteen and approximately twenty percent of which
(13 million) include children under six. 39 About 43 million of
these families live in urban areas; once again, half of these families include children under eighteen and about twenty percent
include children under six.' 0 Given an average family size of 2.75
people, 41 these figures indicate that approximately 84 million
people belong to families containing children under eighteen,
and approximately 36 million belong to families with children
under six.
About forty-four percent (68 million) of all people living in
non-institutional housing live in rental units,• 2 a term which inSee supra text accompanying notes 23-35.
R. MARANS & M. COLTEN, MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL SURVEY 66 (1980) (reporting the results of inter36.
37.

views with tenants and apartment managers and concluding that child exclusion is becoming more common) [hereinafter cited as MARANS].
38. Id. at 37.
39. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION, GENERAL Soc1AL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY, 1-69 [hereinafter cited as POPULATION CENSUS].

40.

Id.

41. Id.
42. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF HOUSING, CHARACTERISTICS OF HouslNG UNITS, GENERAL Hous1NG CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY, 1-59 [hereinafter cited as
HOUSING CENSUS].
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eludes both single-family houses and multiple-dwelling units. 43
The Bureau of the Census has apparently not correlated this
percentage of renters with the percentage of people with children. As raw figures, however, these data suggest that exclusionary policies affect a large proportion of the population. Although
several other factors should enter into a definitive statistical
analysis, if one assumes that the number of people in rental
housing reflects demographically the population as a whole, then
half of all renters belong to families with children under eighteen. As a very rough figure, therefore, these policies potentially
exclude as many as 34 million people from rental housing. 44
The problem becomes more tangible when one looks at figures
for a single class of people: single women who head households.
Such households account for about forty percent of all renters,
the largest single group. 411
HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY WOMEN WITHOUT HusBANDS 46

Total
With children
Under 18
Under 6

Nationwide
8.2 million

Urban
6.8 million

4.9 million
1.7 million

4.2 million
1.5 million

Moreover, female-headed households have less than half the average income of households in which spouses live together. 47 Because low income decreases a person's flexibility in searching for
housing, the people comprising this large segment of the population must depend on their landlords' continued willingness to
allow them to live with their children in rented housing.
The foregoing analysis emphasizes the potential seriousness of
widespread exclusionary policies. Furthermore, the fact that approximately one out of every five rental units currently excludes
families with children adds to the gravity of the problem. 48 Finally, the larger the number of children in a family, the greater
is the likelihood that the family will be excluded from housing. 49
By preventing them from finding adequate rental housing, the
Id. at B-9.
See generally HOUSING CENSUS, supra note 42.
A. DowNs, supra note 1, at 3.
POPULATION CENSUS, supra note 39, at 1-69.
47. A. DOWNS, supra note 1, at 3.
48. MARANS, supra note 37, at ES-2.
49. Id.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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policy of excluding families with children primarily burdens
those families already suffering the economic pressures associated with large families.

II.

PUBLIC POLICY

Landlords and tenants who support policies excluding families
with children rely upon specific instances of children's misbehavior or upon the tastes of individual renters to argue for a
broad freedom to impose restrictions on renting to families. In
contrast, advocates of unrestricted access to housing point to the
fallacy of their opponents' characterization of most children as
annoying. Furthermore, they argue, families looking for housing
would more than fill vacancies generated by tenants who would
move rather than be forced to live near children.
A.

Policies Favoring the Exclusion of Children from Rental
Housing

Two notions support the exclusion of families with children
from rental housing. First, because children are boisterous, they
will annoy other tenants. 60 Second, having children as tenants
will cost landlords money. 61 The two themes are closely interwoven: because children frequently destroy property, they cost
landlords money in upkeep and insurance, and, partly in response to children's objectionable behavior, potential tenants
choose to live elsewhere, causing landlords either to forego rents
or else to pay more to advertise and secure new tenants. 62 Despite the close relationship between these two factors, one can
trace the individual strands of the arguments.
1. Children's offensive behavior- The leading case on child
exclusion from the early 1970's, Flowers v. John Burnham and
Co., 63 addressed the argument that landlords have a right to ex50. Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644, 645
(1971) (permitting exclusion of boys over five because of their "independence, mischievousness, boisterousness and rowdyism").
51. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 729, 640 P.2d 115, 119, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 501, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v.
Beznos Corp., 125 Mich. App. 500, 504-05, 336 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1982), atf'd, 421 Mich.
110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984).
52. CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 5.
53. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).
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elude certain classes of tenants because of an expectation that
such tenants will engage in undesirable conduct. The appellate
court upheld a landlord's exclusion of boys over five from his
apartments, finding that "the independence, mischievousness,
boisterousness and rowdyism of children vary by age and sex,"
and that "regulating tenants' ages and sex to that extent is not
unreasonable or arbitrary."G•
As a threshold matter, one should note that the Flowers court
required no evidence that any tenants actually objected to the
presence of particular children, but instead held that the effusive behavior of children in general justified their exclusion from
an apartment complex. Precisely because the court relied on
group characteristics to exclude individuals, the California Supreme Court subsequently overruled Flowers,H maintaining that
"[e]ven a true generalization about [a] class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply." 118 Despite the California Supreme Court's
position, however, other states need not forbid owners from engaging in these group generalizations. G7
Of course, some tenants do in fact respond negatively to the
presence of any children, often voicing aesthetic concerns. 68
Other tenants may raise more serious objections to the presence
of children and adolescents. Especially when individual children
have engaged in acts of vandalism, landlords and other tenants
may generalize from that behavior and exclude people whom
they perceive as potential troublemakers. 119
In addition to the problem of generalization, the variety of
54. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
55. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 738-39, 640 P.2d 115, 125, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 507 (holding that such selection is arbitrary and illegal), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
858 (1982).
56. Id. at 740, 640 P.2d at 127, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (emphasis omitted)).
57. The California legislature and California Supreme Court protect an extremely
broad range of classes under their equal protection guarantees. See the discussion of
protected classes in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d. 721, 730-36, 640 P.2d 115,
120-24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 502-06, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). Not every state will
draft or interpret its constitution and statutes so broadly.
58. "The noise and laughter of children at play may be music to the ears of their
parents and others who are kindly disposed toward children. That noise, laughter and
occasional boisterousness, however, can be greatly disturbing to those not so favorably
disposed." O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 178, 183 Cal. Rptr.
111, 117-18 (1982), rev'd, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
59. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 727-28, 640 P.2d 115, 118, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 500, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982) (landlord argued that previous young
tenants had "engaged in annoying or potentially dangerous activities," and that the
landlord was therefore justified in excluding families with children in the future).
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people's reactions to the presence of children in housing increases the difficulty in resolving the controversy. At one extreme are those tenants who, without any reason stronger than a
preference for a particular style of life, wish to live apart from
children. 60 At the other extreme stand those tenants who have
suffered some injury, either trivial or serious, and now generalize
in order to avoid repetitions or even reminders of the injury. Despite the difference in the merits of their claims, both of these
groups will unite to protest any action that allows the presence
of children in a particular housing area.
Any analysis of this problem must also address the views of a
particularly vocal group of tenants-the elderly. 61 While some
authorities question the validity of excluding children from
housing for the general public,62 a significant number of commentators agree that the elderly have a right to live in communities reserved for their exclusive use if they so desire. 63 To support their view, these commentators cite the many social and
psychological benefits that accrue to the elderly in retirement
communities. 64 In particular, they note that a disproportionately
high number of crimes committed against the elderly occur in
the world outside their retirement communities and that adolescents and young adults perpetrate a disproportionate number of
these crimes. 611 Thus, commentators suggest that segregating the
elderly from the young will tend to lower the rate at which the
latter prey on the former. 66 .
60.

CBS News, No Kids Allowed, supra note 5; CBS News, Adults Only, supra note

5.

61. See Doyle, supra note 7; Travalio, supra note 3.
62. See Dunaway & Blied, supra note 3; O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3;
Travalio, supra note 3; Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 3; Note, Housing
Discrimination, supra note 3.
63. See generally Doyle, supra note 7 (examining constitutional challenges to retirement communities and concluding that it is constitutionally permissible to exclude the
young from areas zoned or planned for the elderly); Travalio, supra, note 3; see also
Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 229, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (1974) (finding the exclusion of
children from a mobile home park permissible behavior because older adults' "housing
interests and needs differ from families with children").
64. In these communities the. elderly live within a network of friends with similar
interests who often serve to take the place of friends who have died or moved away.
Travalio, supra note 3, at 318-19. Removed from the outside world with its pervasive
work ethic, they can enjoy their retirement without feeling idle or superfluous. Id. Unlike
most apartment buildings, these communities can provide special physical facilities, such
as ramps, wide doors, and housing on one floor. Id.
65. Id. at 319-20.
66. The segregation may not itself protect the elderly. Rather, a retirement community may better afford its residents protection. For example, the neighborhood may be
more easily patrolled and the building doors more securely guarded. No one, however,
seems to have raised the counterargument that a high concentration of old people in a
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Many elderly people also argue that because they have already
raised their own children, they have the right to live the remainder of their lives apart from those of other people. 67 This attitude resembles the aesthetic disapproval of tenants that was discussed earlier. 68 To resolve these problems, the law, while
acknowledging that society generally allows individuals to
choose particular lifestyles without having to defend their
choices,69 steps in when these choices interfere with conflicting
choices made by others.
2. Economic injury to landlords- Landlords and apartment
managers may also advocate exclusion. Unlike tenants, however,
who presumably care only about the quality of their individual
lives, landlords and managers concern themselves both with the
physical maintenance of apartment buildings and complexes70
and with the collective contentment of residents as reflected in
continued full occupancy. At first sight, one might expect the
property damage children cause to play an important role in
landlords' decisions to exclude children. The evidence, however,
does not support this position. The HUD/ISR survey, which
solicited apartment managers' reactions to the presence of children in their units, found those managers who rented to families
with children least likely to deem children a problem. 71
Of course one could attribute this finding to the fact that
those landlords least likely to find children a problem may, in
turn, choose most frequently to rent to families with children.
On the other hand, one might instead draw the conclusion that
once landlords rent to tenants with children they realize that
children often do not present a problem. Although no conclusive
evidence exists for either position, a portion of the HUD/ISR
study bolsters the latter interpretation.
The study found no basis for the landlords' assumption that
the presence of children in their apartments leads to increased
neighborhood may make it more conspicuous and hence more vulnerable to attack.
67. CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 5.
68. See supra text accompanying note 58.
69. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (village has a right to
define its goals and zone accordingly); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977).
70. When asked to rate difficulties associated with managing apartments, only one
percent of the managers responding included children on their list. MARANS, supra note
37, at 66-67. "Managers of buildings or complexes not accepting children are twice as
likely as managers of buildings and complexes accepting children to view each [of several
suggested areas where children might cause trouble] as problematical." Id. at 66.
71. Id. at 57, 60. See also D. ASHFORD & P. EsTON, THE EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN IN HOUSING: A STUDY OF FIVE CALIFORNIA CITIES 36
(1979).
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repair costs and increased insurance premiums. 72 The study also
indicated that landlords' views do not represent an accurate assessment of the cost of allowing children as tenants, but rather
are a facile answer to those parents seeking housing for themselves and their families. Landlords combine their assumptions
about property costs with further assumptions about the concerns and prejudices of their tenants who, they assert, will move
out if children are allowed to move in. The study found that
approximately twenty-five percent of those apartment dwellers
living in housing that excludes children explicitly chose to live
there because of that exclusionary policy. 73 This significance of
child exclusion policies to potential tenants suggests that even
landlords who realize that children present few problems to
them directly may still choose to exclude children to appease
their tenants. 74
Although the arguments up to this point have emphasized the
harm that children can cause their neighbors or the landlords'
property, landlords have also raised a number of concerns about
harm to children. 711 In defense of an exclusionary policy, landlords have argued that their apartment complexes were designed
with traffic patterns that did not take into account the presence
of children. 76 Landlords maintain that they must plan construction sites and recreation facilities to avoid endangering young
children or that they must confine children to one portion of a
large complex to prevent their roaming unattended over danger. ous areas. 77 Although no court has definitively ruled on the validity of these arguments, courts in Michigan have ruled in favor
of landlords asserting the claims. 78
72. MARANS, supra note 37, at 59.
73. Id. at 65.
74. As evidence of this phenomenon, the landlords cite examples of people refusing to
rent apartments if they believe that children will live nearby. Affidavits of Apartment
Owners at llb-37b, Defendant-Appellee's Brief and Appendix, Michigan Dep't of Civil
Rights v. Beznos Corp., Supreme Court No. 71737 (Mich. filed July 30, 1984). The Michigan Court of Appeals accepted this argument in Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos
Corp., 125 Mich. App. 500, 505, 336 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1983) (finding that to prohibit
exclusion of children would "force landlords to bear increased economic burdens"), aff'd,
421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Affidavits of Apartment Owners at Ub-37b, Defendant-Appellee's Brief
and Appendix, Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., Supreme Court No.
71737 (Mich. filed July 30, 1984).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., Oakland County Circuit
Court No. 80-202870-CZ (Mich. 1981), aff'd, 125 Mich. App. 500, 336 N.W.2d 494 (1983),
a{f'd, 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984). In Beznos, the owner of an apartment complex maintained an adults-only complex and a second complex which admitted families
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Public Policies Opposing the Exclusion of Children from
Rental Housing

Opponents of the exclusion of children from rental housing
often maintain that landlords cannot impose restrictions on children who have not themselves harmed anyone. 79 The California
Supreme Court, for example, noted in one case that no concrete
facts existed regarding the number of children involved in offensive activities to support the plaintiff landlord's worries about
future misbehavior. 80 In general, landlords' fears of annoying
and destructive behavior from child tenants appear to be greater
than reality warrants. 81
Furthermore, the HUD/ISR study results directly conflict
with the assertion that tenants would never rent or would move
if forced to live near children. While about seventeen percent of
tenants currently living in age-restricted apartments would leave
if children moved into the apartments, eighty-one percent would
remain. 82 Likewise, about seventy-five percent of those participating in the study did not choose their present apartment on
the basis of whether or not the landlord had an exclusionary
policy. 83
Although the twenty percent of tenants who refuse to live
with children constitute a significant number of renters, they
represent a small minority when compared with the fifty percent
of families seeking apartments who claim that they have been
victims of discrimination. 84 Indeed, the fact that the number of
people seeking rental housing for themselves and their children
appears to offset the number of people who might move when
faced with the prospect of young neighbors contradicts the landlords' assertion that they would lose tenants if forced to rent to
families with children. Consequently, a sensible public policy
with children, but restricted them to one portion of the complex. The Michigan courts
determined that the landlord's actions did not violate the state's civil rights statute. See
infra text accompanying notes 141-50.
79. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 728, 640 P.2d 115, 118, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 500 (presenting landlord's argument that the misbehavior of other children in
the past justified the exclusion of a family with a new baby, despite neighbors' assertions
that the baby caused no problems), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). See also supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
80. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 728, 640 P.2d 115, 118, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 500, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
81. See supra text accompanying note 72.
82. MARANS, supra note 37, at 61.
83. See supra text accompanying note 73.
84. MARANs, supra note 37, at ES-3.
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should attempt to avoid this restriction on families' ability to
rent freely and limit exclusionary policies only to exceptional
circumstances. 811

Ill.

THE LEGALITY OF EXCLUDING CHILDREN FROM HOUSING

Although plaintiffs have sought relief from exclusionary policies under both federal and state laws, federal courts do not appear to be a successful arena in which to challenge exclusionary
policies. Plaintiffs have had difficuly satisfying standing requirements for constitutional or civil rights actions, and other statutory protections do not appear to apply to families with
children.
In contrast, some state laws do expressly prohibit child-exclusion practices. Although those statutes are frequently underutilized, explicit legislation seems the most desirable solution. Actions under state civil rights acts have led to contradictory and
confusing results.
A.

Federal Law

Plaintiffs seeking to challenge the exclusionary practices of
landlords and property owners under federal law have brought
constitutional claims based on either due process or equal protection, or statutory actions under federal civil rights and fair
housing statutes. Although courts have not yet addressed all the
issues in these areas, plaintiffs have so far enjoyed only limited
success. Judging from the rulings courts have made, federal law
does not appear to present a fruitful avenue for attacking childexclusion policies.
1. The Constitution- The United States Constitution does
not appear to prohibit the exclusion of children from housing. 88
Only in certain limited circumstances does a plaintiff appear
able to bring a constitutional challenge against such practices.
Because other commentators have discussed in detail the broad
constitutional implications of child exclusion, 87 this Note will
simply summarize and update these arguments.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69.
86. Of course, plaintiffs may have more success under provisions in state
constitutions.
87. See Doyle, supra note 7; Travalio, supra note 3.
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To allege that the exclusion of children from a dwelling violates either due process or equal protection, a plaintiff must first
satisfy the state action requirement. 88 Because the government
plays no role in most exclusionary practices, 89 most plaintiffs
name private individuals or corporations as defendants and cannot therefore pass this threshold requirement. 90 In an exceptional case, however, Halet v. Wend Investment Co.,91 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found state action because the
landlord, who refused to rent to a family with a child, had an
unusually interdependent relationship with the county. 92 Thus,
even though most plaintiffs cannot fulfill the state action test, in
special circumstances like Halet a plaintiff may be able to raise
a constitutional challenge.
A plaintiff who meets the state action requirement must then
assert an infringement of her rights that violates either equal
protection or due process. To support such an assertion, the
plaintiff must establish that the government's practice involved
either a suspect classification or a fundamental right. If the
plaintiff establishes either of these, a court must strictly scrutinize the government's action. 93 Because, however, the Supreme
Court has held that age does not constitute a suspect classification,94 children excluded from housing on the basis of their age
cannot challenge the exclusion with the allegation that they be88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If the federal government attempts to discriminate,
then a plaintiff can challenge its actions under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. See, e.g., In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the fourteenth
amendment reaches only state action); cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (holding that a state participating in several aspects of the operation of a
private business satisfies the state action requirement).
90. If, however, the government passed legislation such as a zoning ordinance that
excluded children, a plaintiff could satisfy the state action requirement. A judge who
issues an injunction or awards damages in compliance with a discriminatory restrictive
covenant might also satisfy the requirement. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
91. 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982). See Case Note, Real Property-Prospective Tenant Denied Housing Because of Adults-Only Policy Has Cause of Action Under Fourteenth Amendment and Fair Housing Act-Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d
1305 (9th Cir. 1982), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 965 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Case Note].
92. 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982). Examples of the interdependence included
the facts that the county owned the land and leased it to Wend; that the county oversaw
the development of the area and had final approval of the plans; that it controlled the
use of the buildings and the rent charged; that Wend paid a percentage of the rentals to
the county; and that Wend had to abide by all the conditions of its lease, which forbade
racial and religious discrimination.
93. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). If the
court should determine that there is no basis for strict scrutiny of the challenged statute,
then it will ask only whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational
relationship to an end of government that the Constitution does not prohibit.
94. Id. at 313.
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long to a protected class. Nevertheless, they might be able to
invoke strict judicial scrutiny on some other basis. 95
Decisions provide somewhat more hope for success in a challenge alleging the violation of a fundamental right. Although the
Supreme Court held in Lindsey u. Normet 96 that access to housing does not represent a fundamental right, a plaintiff might still
assert that the exclusion of children violates the right of privacy.97 Indeed, in Moore u. City of East Cleueland, 98 Justice
Powell's plurality opinion stated that government intrusion on
choices concerning family living arrangements would trigger a,
search for a compelling state interest that the discriminatory action furthers. 99 The Halet court interpreted this to mean that if
a lower court found that the challenged adults-only rental policy
deprived family members of the right to live together, it would
have to forbid the practice unless it could discover a compelling
state interest. 100 Thus, to challenge successfully a child-exclusion
policy on constitutional grounds, a plaintiff must first establish
state action and then demonstrate that no compelling state interest exists.
2. Statutes- A number of plaintiffs have challenged childexclusion policies under federal statutes, specifically the Fair
Housing Act101 and sections 1982 and 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act. 102 No court, however, has definitively decided whether any
of these statutes protect the rights of families excluded from
housing because of their children. Instead, plaintiffs have had
success only where they could establish that the exclusionary
practices disproportionately discriminated against women or
minorities.
In Halet, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of a complaint filed under section 1983, 103 finding that the
95. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Although Halet
lacked standing to raise racial discrimination claims under § 1983 and the fourteenth
amendment, he clearly has standing to challenge the adults-only policy under § 1983 and
the fourteenth amendment on the grounds that it violates his right to raise a family and
discriminates against families with children").
96. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive in [the Constitution] any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality. . . . ").
97. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
99. Id. at 499.
100. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1982).
101. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
102. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1982-1983 (1982).
103. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
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landlord's policies arguably infringed upon the plaintiff's right
to raise a family and discriminated against families with children.10• The plaintiff in Halet, however, did not pursue his complaint and no other plaintiff has raised a similar section 1983
claim. Consequently, the applicability of section 1983 to child
exclusion remains undecided. One should nevertheless note that
because section 1983 merely permits a damage action for infringement of constitutional rights, a plaintiff would still have to
establish state action and the absence of a compelling state
interest. ioG
Two recent discrimination cases brought under the Fair Housing Act106 have presented an intriguing mixture of arguments
based on child exclusion and racial discrimination. Among other
claims, the plaintiff in Halet alleged that because blacks and
Hispanics generally have more children in their families than
whites, the landlord's exclusionary policy disproportionately affected them in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 107 Although
the district court found that the white plaintiff in Halet had no
standing to sue, the Ninth Circuit held that the Act's liberal
standing requirements did grant the plaintiff a cause of
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
104. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1~10-11 (9th Cir. 1982).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
Plaintiffs have tried to bring suit under § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982), but because
the Supreme Court has held that that section applies only to cases of racial discrimination, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), they have had no success in
using that provision to challenge child exclusion policies. In Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F.
Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court squarely addressed a claim under § 1982's provision that "[A]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to ... purchase [and] lease ...
real ... property." The case involved a Puerto Rican family that claimed that their
landlord, in refusing to rent to them, had discriminated against them on the basis of
race. The plaintiff alleged race discrimination in his complaint, and the court accepted
for purposes of argument that ethnic origin could be a racial characteristic. Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. at 944. The landlord argued that he had refused to rent not because
they were Puerto Rican but because too many children would occupy the apartment.
The court upheld the landlord's limitation on the size of tenant families, finding that
prejudice against the tenants' nationality had played no part in the landlord's decision.
Id. As part of the rationale for its holding, the court quoted from Bush v. Kaim, 297 F.
Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1972), which held that § 1982 did not prevent an owner from
considering factors other than race when deciding whether to rent to a prospective tenant. Specifically, the court said, "[S]uch factors ... include ... the size of [a tenant's]
family, the ages of his children . . . ." Id. at 162.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982).
107. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982).
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action. 108
The Fourth Circuit, in Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 109
went beyond Halet's limited standing holding. There, the owners attempted to institute an all-adults policy by forcing those
residents who had children to move. Because most of the residents asked to leave were black, the court held that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discriminatory impact
under the Act. 110 Thus, the Fair Housing Act, which requires no
state action, may afford some relief to minorities subject to child
exclusion policies.

B.

State Law

Only a few states currently have statutes expressly addressing
the housing rights of families with children; none of these laws,
however, is fully satisfactory. Yet the inconclusive experiences of
those states that have attempted to solve the problem through
judicial interpretation of general civil rights statutes suggest
that a specific statute addressing the rights of all parties is the
most desirable solution. An analysis of current state laws and
their faults, as well as of judicial decisions, indicates areas in
which a model statute can improve existing law.
1. State statutes forbidding the exclusion of childrenNine states have to date enacted statutes expressly forbidding
discrimination against families with children. 111 Although these
statutes address the problem of discrimination against families,
tenants have rarely used them. 112 Both the public's lack of
awareness of these statutes and the difficulties involved in pursuing a remedy have contributed to this underuse. Not until legislatures remove these obstacles will landlords abandon their
discriminatory practices. The following section describes the sig108. The anomalous facts of Halet limit its precedential value. First, the plaintiff
fulfilled the state action requirement. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Second,
by the time the court decided the case, Los Angeles had passed an anti-discrimination
ordinance, which the owner chose to obey even though the apartment complex in which
Halet resided was located outside the city limits. Nevertheless, rather than deem it moot,
the court chose to decide the case because of the following: first, the owner could revert
to an adults-only policy in the future, and failed to demonstrate that no reasonable expectation of such an occurrence existed. Second, whether the owner's new policy had
completely eradicated the effect of its prior adults-only policy remained unclear. Halet v.
Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d at 1307-08.
109. 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
110. Id. at 988.
111. See supra note 13.
112. O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3.
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nificant features of these state statutes and discusses some of
their strengths and weaknesses.
The problem of tenant underutilization of the protections afforded by state statutes prohibiting child exclusion does not lie
in the novelty of antidiscrimination measures; indeed, New
.Jersey passed such an act in 1898.118 States enacted the earliest
of these laws at a time when landlords wielded even greater
power than they do today,1 14 and when such laws provided tenants with the only protection they had. The typical antidiscrimination statute contains an initial flat prohibition against
child exclusion, followed by a series of exceptions that permit
discrimination under certain circumstances.1 111 All of the statutes, for example, allow elderly people to live in certain buildings or areas without children. 116 Other exceptions permit child
exclusion in one or two-family houses, 117 owner-occupied
houses, 118 and temporary leasing situations. 119 Some states also
allow restrictions on the number of children in multi-building
housing complexes. 120
Yet the mere existence of these statutes has not resulted in
their application. Indeed, little litigation appears to have occurred in this field. m This inactivity could imply acquiescence
by landlords to the dictates of the statutes or summary lowercourt affirmation of tenants' rights. Instead, one survey indicates
that ignorance of such antidiscriminatory statutes may explain
this inactivity. 122
113. L. 1898, c. 235, p. 794.
114. Note, Housing Discrimination, supra note 3, at 570.
115. See supra note 13.
116. See supra note 13.
117. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-64a (West 1983).
118. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64a (West 1983); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B,
§ 4(11) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp.
1984-1985); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
119. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
120. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 363.02 (1984).
121. A search on LEXIS, STATES library, using the statute numbers as search
terms, discovered one case each in Arizona, Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d
747 (1974) (dealing with privately owned lots in a mobile home development); Connecticut, Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. 648, 652 n.l, 458 A.2d 355, 357 n.l (1983) (finding
that the relevant statute did not apply retroactively); Illinois, Ill. Dep't of Human Rights
v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp., 122 Ill. App. 3d 517,461 N.E.2d 505 (1984) (holding
that a court did not have the power to enjoin a discriminatory practice directed against
trainers living with their families in the barracks area of a race track); and New Jersey,
Gilman v. Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 180 A.2d 365 (1962) (holding that an ordinance
prohibiting occupation of rooming houses by minors conflicted with state. statute). No
cases were found in the other states.
122. O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3 (reporting that a survey of Illinois district
attorneys' offices discovered that many law enforcement officials were unaware that the
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The laws prohibiting discrimination against children fall into
three categories. One type gives the injured party a right of action against the discriminating landlord. m A second type of
statute merely makes it an "unfair practice" to discriminate and
authorizes courts to fashion appropriate remedies. 124 The third
group makes discrimination illegal and authorizes the use of
criminal sanctions against those who discriminate. m
Unfortunately, under the first two schemes these antidiscrimination measures depend too heavily on the initiative of the
injured parties and require familiarity with, as well as access to,
the court system. Most potential plaintiffs need a home immediately and consequently have neither the time nor the resources
to pursue a complaint. Furthermore, most people, including
those connected with law enforcement agencies, do not know
that these statutes exist. 128
Problems exist even where the state bears the burden of enforcing criminal statutes. Although the threat of criminal prosecution clearly provides a deterrent, the imposition of such sanctions presupposes adequate prosecutorial staffs and sufficient
evidence to convict. The Illinois survey, however, indicates that
prosecutors do not use these laws, 127 which suggests that these
prerequisites do not always exist.
Because it addresses these problems, the Massachusetts statute merits special attention. 128 Not only does it confer a private
right of action on the party that allegedly suffered the wrong, it
also provides an administrative remedy through the Commonwealth Commission Against Discrimination. This agency serves
several purposes and helps to eliminate a number of the
problems found in other states' statutes. It can help disseminate
information about the statute to the public and aid in its invocation.129 The agency can develop expertise in processing comstatute existed).
123. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp.
1983-1984).
124. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-.03 (1984) .
. 125. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 33-303, -1317 (Supp. 1984-1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-64a (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
126. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3.
127. Id.
128. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4(11) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
129. A commission may have more success than an individual tenant in getting a
landlord to comply with an antidiscrimination law. For example, a landlord may feel less
confident that it could win a war of attrition against the commission. A landlord may
also be unwilling to engender ill will in a commission that will review his actions for
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plaints and reap the benefits of efficiencies obtained from handling large numbers of claims instead of the infrequent
complaints received by local prosecutors' offices throughout a
state. 13° Consequently, any statute that seeks to remedy the
problem of child exclusion should authorize a commission to enforce its provisions.
2. Judicial interpretation of state civil rights statutesMany states that do not have statutes explicitly forbidding the
exclusion of children in housing do have general civil rights statutes that courts could use to prohibit child exclusion. 181 So far,
however, only two state courts have applied their civil rights
statutes to the question of exclusionary practices, and they have
come to opposite conclusions. Because these statutes appear on
the surface to contain no significant differences, these two conflicting cases offer no conclusive resolution of this issue. In fact,
each case has raised further questions.
In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 182 the California Supreme
Court applied the Unruh Civil Rights Act188 to a situation where
a landlord attempted to evict a family from an adults-only
apartment complex after the birth of their son. The court held
that the Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of age, even
though the Act did not enumerate age as a protected classification.184 To reach its holding, the court found that the legislature
had intended the list of protected classes to be read
years to come. The success and ease with which the Massachusetts commission has handled claims, see infra note 130, supports this position.
130. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3.
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination indicates that it is able to deal
with most problems with a simple telephone conversation with the landlord, and that the
threat of legal action is usually sufficient to stop attempted discrimination. (Telephone
interview with Leslie Greer of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
(Feb. 28, 1985).)
131. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (1976);
Kv. REV. STAT. § 344.120 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20 (Supp. 1984); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 213.105 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 49-2-305 (Supp.
1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-107 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8V(a) (1984); R.I.
GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-4 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 20-13-21(1) (Supp. 1984); VA.
CoDE § 36-88 (1984); W. VA. CoDE § 5-11-9(g) (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22
(West Supp. 1984-85).
132. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858
(1982).
133. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE§ 51 (West 1982):
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
134. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 724-25, 640 P.2d 115, 117, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, 498, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
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expansively. 136
California courts have reached the same result when interpreting the Unruh Act in different contexts. The same year it decided Marina Point the California Supreme Court heard a similar case involving a condominium138 and found that the Act
prohibited the builder of the condominium and the association
which administered it from discriminating against families with
children. In 1984 a California appellate court ruled on a similar
issue,1 37 this time allowing a family with a child to remain in its
mobile home despite a park rule prohibiting children.
In spite of the holdings, political forces appear to have undermined these decisions. 138 The Department of Fair Employment
and Housing, the department empowered to hear complaints of
violations of the California civil rights act, has only recently
agreed to take complaints from individuals alleging exclusion because of children. 139 Just as with statutes that explicitly forbid
discrimination against children in housing, 140 a legal rule will not
achieve its intended purpose unless law enforcers use the rule.
Like the California Supreme Court, the Michigan Supreme
Court, in Michigan Department of Civil Rights v. Beznos
Corp., 141 has applied its civil rights statute142 to a landlord's discrimination against a family with children. The case involved
the owner of two suburban Detroit apartment complexes who
.permitted families with children to rent in only one part of one
complex yet allowed tenants without children to rent an apartment in any part of either complex. 143 Unlike its California
135. Id.
136. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1982).
137. Adamson Cos. v. Zipp, 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984).
138. Telephone interviews with Jim Morales, Nat'! Center for Youth Law, San Francisco (Oct. 2, 1984; Feb. 28, 1985).
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 111-130 and accompanying text.
141. 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984).
142. Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-.2804 (1979); MicH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102(1) (West Supp. 1984-85) reads:
The opportunity to obtain . . . housing and other real estate . . . without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height,
weight, or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized and declared to
be a civil right (emphasis added).
143. The apartment owner appealed the initial ruling against it by the State Civil
Rights Commission to the circuit court, which ruled on the stipulated question, whether
"the owner of a multi-family apartment complex (may) lawfully restrict families with
children to certain designated buildings." Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp.,
Oakland County Circuit Court No. 80-202870-CZ (Mich. 1981). The circuit court ruled
that the action specified in the stipulated question was "not ... per se violative... if
[it] is taken by the landlord in the interest of the comfort and safety of all the tenants."
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counterpart, the Michigan Supreme Court did not rely on legislative intent but on precedent144 to argue that an expansive
reading of the statute would prevent the state from enforcing
"'regulations, rules, laws and policies designed to protect children.' "HCI By this it meant that to prohibit a landlord absolutely
from discriminating on the basis of age would force landlords to
rent to minors acting alone. 148 Because "the civil rights act does
not prohibit differential treatment of minors per se where such
treatment is reasonably necessitated by the special nature and
characteristics of children," 147 the court rejected a broad interpretation of the Act.
The court explicitly stopped short, however, of deciding what
restrictions a landlord could impose on families with children. 148
This reticence prompted a dissenting justice to maintain that
the court's ruling decided nothing and that, because it had no
relation to the facts of the case, it represented, in substance, an
unauthorized advisory opinion. 149 The Michigan Supreme
Id. The Department of Civil Rights appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower court's decision. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 125
Mich. App. 500, 336 N.W.2d 494 (1983). In its opinion, however, the court of appeals
answered a broader question than the one stipulated to by the parties, finding that the
Civil Rights Act "prohibits discrimination on the basis of chronological age in real estate
transactions but makes no mention of disparate treatment of families with children." Id.
at 503, 336 N.W.2d at 495. Citing increased economic burdens that would fall on landlords, as well as the annoyance to tenants desiring to live apart from children, the court
"decline[d] to infer a broad legislative intention to require that all apartments be made
available to children." Id. at 505, 336 N.W.2d at 496. The court of appeals thus left the
way open for landlords not merely to segregate children to one portion of a complex, but
even to exclude children completely if the landlord's economic interests or tenants'
wishes seemed to make such a step expedient.
One dissenting judge compared the Beznos case to United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d
789 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1982), prevented a landlord from steering black tenants to one area of an apartment complex. The judge argued that the more explicit Michigan statute, which includes
age, a category not mentioned in the federal statute, must preclude both the narrow
restriction of families to particular buildings as well as the broader restriction, the complete exclusion, which the majority decision suggested might be permissible. Mich. Dep't
of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 125 Mich. App. 500, 507-10, 336 N.W.2d 494, 497-98
(1983) (Mackenzie, J., dissenting).
144. Cheeseman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 108 Mich. App. 428, 310 N.W.2d
408 (1981) (holding that steps taken by movie theaters to prevent children under acertain age from attending R-rated films did not violate the civil rights act).
145. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 119-20, 365 N.W.2d
82, 87 (1984) (quoting Cheeseman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 108 Mich. App. 428,
433, 310 N.W.2d 408, 411 (1981)).
146. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 120, 365 N.W.2d 82,
87 (1984).
147. Id. at 121, 365 N.W.2d at 88 (1984).
148. Id. at 118, 365 N.W.2d at 86 (1984).
149. Id. at 123, 365 N.W.2d at 88-89 (1984) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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Court's majority opinion suggests that the plaintiff, the Department of Civil Rights, chose to ask the wrong question. 150 Because the plaintiff stipulated too narrow a question, one can predict a spate of other challenges to landlords' actions as tenants
attempt to determine exactly what the civil rights act allows
their landlords to do.
The experiences of Michigan and California thus demonstrate
the uncertainty that results from applying civil rights statutes to
the problem of exclusionary policies. Moreover, Marina Point
took five years to go from injury to final decision-six if one
counts the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. 151
Similarly, Beznos has taken seven years to reach a conclusion on
an extremely technical point. 152 Neither case has definitively
ruled on all types of housing. In such a volatile area of law, application of state civil rights statutes provides an unsatisfactory
remedy. 153

IV.

CONCLUSION AND MODEL STATUTE

The exclusion of children from housing poses a serious problem. The best evidence suggests that as many as one-half of all
families seeking rental housing have encountered difficulties because of child-exclusion policies and that more and more landlords are adopting these policies. Moreover, the problem of exclusionary policies has spilled over into other types of housing.
Consequently, residents of condominiums, mobile home parks,
and even private homes find themselves confronted with obstacles to acquiring property or continuing to live in their homes.
Unfortunately, existing statutes have proved ineffective in
prohibiting this discrimination. To cure these deficiencies, this
Note. proposes a model statute that combines the best features
of the current statutes with provisions addressing new concerns.
While retaining exceptions for valid interests, such as those of
the elderly, the model statute would directly prohibit discrimination against children in all forms of housing and would estab150. Id. at 117-18, 365 N.W.2d at 86 (1984).
151. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
152. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82
(1984).
153. Note, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n: Winning the War Against Age
Restrictive Covenants But Using the Unruh Act Cannon as a Pea Shooter, 20 CAL. W.L.
REV. 109 (1983).
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lish a commission to enforce its provisions. In this way it seeks
to accommodate the legitimate interests of all parties and to assure adequate and affordable housing to families with children.

MODEL STATUTE

SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS
In this Act:
(a) "Apartment" means a self-contained dwelling unit containing cooking facilities.
(b) "Apartment complex" means a group of
buildings each containing four or more
apartments on a contiguous parcel of land
owned by the same person.
(c) "Child" means any individual under eighteen years of age.
(d) "Condominium" means an estate in real
property consisting of an undivided interest in common in a portion of a parcel of
real property together with a separate interest in space in a residential building.
( e) "Elderly person" means a person over sixty
years of age.
(f) "Family" means two or more individuals related by blood, adoption, or marriage.
(g) "Infirm person" means an individual with a
chronic, debilitating disability.
(h) "Mobile home" means a movable or portable unit, designed and constructed to be
towed on its own chassis (comprising frame
and wheels), and designed to be connected
to utilities for year-round occupancy.
(i)
"Private home" means a single-family or
two-family dwelling in which the owner
maintains a residence for himself or herself
and for the members of his or her family.
(j)
"Rental housing" means a house, mobile
home, condominium, or apartment rented
with or without a lease by a landlord to a
tenant.
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"Tenant" means an individual living in
rental housing; it is not limited to the individual(s) signing a lease.
SECTION 2: PROHIBITION OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CHILDREN IN RENTAL
HOUSING

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Except as provided in Section 3, it is unlawful for a landlord to refuse to rent a housing unit to an individual because of the
presence of children in the prospective tenant's family or because of the pregnancy of
a prospective woman tenant.
It is unlawful for a landlord to terminate a
lease, evict a tenant, or refuse to renew an
existing lease because of the presence of
children in the tenant's family or because
of the pregnancy of a woman tenant.
It is unlawful to advertise rental housing or
to accept an advertisement for rental housing if the advertisement contains any restriction against renting to a family because of children in the prospective
tenant's family or because of the pregnancy
of a prospective woman tenant.
It is unlawful to demand or receive a
greater sum as rent for the use and occupancy of any premises because of children
in the family of the tenant or because of the
pregnancy of a woman tenant.
SECTION 3: EXCEPTIONS

Notwithstanding the prohibitions listed in Section 2, the following situations are not unlawful:
(a) This Act does not affect any local, state or
federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling unit.
(b) This Act does not apply to an owner-occu-
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pied dwelling of four or fewer apartments,
one of which is occupied by the owner.
This Act does not apply to any apartment
house or apartment complex for which the
owner has applied for a waiver and for
which the waiver has been granted by the
state commission for civil rights. The
waiver may apply to:
(1) any apartment house in which a majority of the inhabitants are elderly or
infirm or both;
(2) any single apartment house in which
all current inhabitants have joined in
a petition requesting the landlord to
exclude families with children.
In either case (1) or (2) above, renting to a
family that has children currently living
with it shall act as notice to the landlord
that the waiver is terminated.
In case (2) above, each new tenant must
agree to the conditions of the waiver in order for the waiver to continue to be valid.
In the case of apartment complexes containing one hundred or more apartments, if
the number of children living in the complex is equal to or greater than sixty-five
percent of the number of apartments in the
complex, and if the structure of the buildings and/or the complex is such that families with children may be restricted to specific types of apartments or buildings, then
this Act does not apply.
In the case of apartment complexes, it is
not unlawful for a landlord to restrict children to specific types of apartments or
buildings if there is a rational reason for
doing so. Nevertheless, a landlord may not
refuse to rent an apartment in a substantially similar building to a family unless the
waiver provision in (c)(2) has been fulfilled.
This Act does not apply to the temporary
sub-leasing or assignment of an apartment
by the principal lessee.

SUMMER

1985)

Exclusion of Families

1149

SECTION 4: PROHIBITION OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CHILDREN IN OWNED
HOUSING
Except as provided in Part 5,
(a) It is unlawful for the owner of any condominium, mobile home, or private home to
refuse to sell such condominium, mobile
home, or private home to any prospective
buyer because of the presence of children
in the buyer's family, or because the buyer
or a member of the buyer's family is
pregnant.
(b) It is unlawful for any association or organization representing the owners of any condominiums, mobile homes, or private
homes, or for the owners of the land on
which such condominiums, mobile homes, or
private homes are located,
( 1) to refuse to sell any such condominium, mobile home, or private home; or
(2) to refuse to approve the sale of any
such condominium, mobile home, or
private home, or
(3) to interfere in any way with the sale
of any such condominium, mobile
home, or private home
because of the presence of children in the
buyer's family or because the buyer or a
member of the buyer's family is pregnant.

SECTION 5: EXCEPTIONS
Notwithstanding the prohibitions listed in Section 4, the following situations are not unlawful:
(a) This Act does not affect any local, state, or
federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling unit.
(b) This Act does not apply to any dwelling
unit for which the owner has applied for a
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waiver and for which the waiver has been
accepted by the state commission for civil
rights. The waiver may apply to:
(1) Any condominium complex in which a
majority of the inhabitants are elderly
or infirm or both, and which has been
designed specifically for occupancy by
such individuals.
(2) Any condominium complex, mobile
home park, or subdivision in which all
current inhabitants have joined in a
petition requesting the owners' association to exclude families with
children.
In either case (1) or (2) above, sale of a unit
to a family with children must be approved
by two-thirds of the current residents of
the condominium complex, mobile home
park, or subdivision. Such a sale will remove the condominium complex, mobile
home park, or subdivision from the protection of this section.
In case (2) above, each new buyer must
agree to the conditions of the waiver in order for the waiver to continue to be valid.
Refusal to sign the petition shall be
grounds for the sale not to be approved.
In the case of condominium complexes containing one hundred or more units, or of
mobile home parks covering thirty or more
acres, it is not unlawful for the managing
association to restrict families with children to one building or group of buildings,
or to one geographical area, provided there
is a rational reason for doing so.
SECTION 6: REMEDIES

Any person who feels injured by the violation of
a provision of Section 1 or Section 4 has the
right to complain to the state commission for
civil rights, which is designated to petition for
relief in any court of competent jurisdiction. If
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the commission fails to find a violation within
twenty days, the person alleging injury has the
right to petition for relief in any court of compe•
tent jurisdiction.
If a court determines that a person was injured
by a violation of this Act, damages are limited to
the cost of replacement housing during the time
that the party suft"ered injury.
-George Palmer Schober

